4 obliged to make a universal statement, which is not applicable to all, but only to most, cases; and whenever it is difficult to give a definition owing to the infinite number of cases . . . for life would not be long enough to reckon all the possibilities. If then no exact definition is possible, but legislation is necessary, one must have recourse to general terms." 9 This is not the place to recount in detail the subsequent history of equitable correction, a history that includes the writings of Cicero in the Laws, the development of aequitas in Roman law and the power of the Praetors in Rome, and the growth of the courts of equity and then the emergence of a distinctive law of equity in England. 10 And the principal reason for not laboring over the history here is that all of these subsequent developments are variations on the basic theme that we have inherited from
Plato and Aristotle -legal rules by virtue of their intrinsic generality will sometimes produce wrong answers, and it is possible for a legal system to create mechanisms and institutions whose job is to correct those wrong answers. When such mechanisms are in place, and thus when individuals and institutions have the power to correct the recalcitrant experiences that are the inevitable consequence of general rules, we can say that the rules of the system are defeasible. Legal rules might be defeated, and good outcomes substituted for rule-generated bad ones, when faithful application of the rules themselves would on a particular occasion 11 otherwise produce the wrong answer.
Defeasibility can be institutionalized in any number of ways. Among the most familiar is the one we have inherited from Aristotle and then Cicero and then the English, the mechanism by virtue of which some person or institution -the chancellor, for example -has the authority to correct law's mistakes when those mistakes would work an injustice. This is what has traditionally been called "equity," but the issues are complicated. Initially there is the question of whose job it is to do equity. As equity arose in England, for example, the power to make an equitable correction was separated from the power to enforce, apply, and even interpret the law. Residing originally with the chancellor, and then with jurisdictionally separate courts of equity, the power of equitable correction, by being distinct from the law, was not inconsistent with the nondefeasibility of legal rules. The legal rules might work an injustice, but from the perspective of the law (in the strict sense, and not including courts of equity), there was nothing to be done about it. And in this sense the rules of the law were not defeasible, even though the power of defeat -of equitable override -was granted within an institution that, more broadly, was part of the legal system.
Over time, however, the institution of equity as a discrete system of separate courts and separate procedures has withered in most common law countries. Equity still exists, more or less, but courts of equity and distinct equity-focused institutions and procedures are becoming extinct, even though they have not fully become so yet. But even with the decline of distinct equity jurisdiction and procedure, and arguably because of that decline, common law courts still routinely exercise the power of equitable override, and this is the central form of defeasibility. When application of the lawwhether a statute or a common law rule with a widely-shared formulation -will produce an unjust result, common law courts often retain or claim the power to set aside the rule or the statute in the service of justice. 12 Sometimes this process of setting aside the rule will be conceptualized as adding an exception to the existing rule, 13 and so themselves.
add "ad hoc exceptions" to existing and exceptionless rules. 14 And Posner's claim is virtually identical to Hart's that not only can a rule with an "unless" clause still be a rule, but also that the list of "unlesses" cannot be exhaustively specified in advance.
15
Richard Tur's position is similar to Hart's and Posner's, for he too insists that treating rules as defeasible is not merely desirable or useful, and not merely common, but is an essential component of a well-functioning -non-defective --legal system.
There are two qualifications that need to be noted here. First, the power of equitable override -of equity-driven defeasibility -will collapse into a rule-free system of equity if the standards for an equitable override are not higher than the simple fact of the existing rule producing an unjust result. If any injustice is a sufficient condition for an equitable override, then a regime of rules subject to equitable override is extensionally equivalent to a regime of no rules at all in which the decision-makers are empowered simply to reach the most just all-things-considered outcome. 16 And the same can be said if we substitute efficiency, utility maximization, fairness or anything else in the foregoing formula. In order for the rules to do the work that rules are expected to do -provide predictability, stability, and constraint on decision-makers -the standards for equitable override of a rule-produced mistake must be one of extreme injustice, or great inefficiency, or something of that variety. If defeasibility implicitly incorporates the necessity of the standard for defeat being higher than the standard sufficient for the same considerations to have indicated a result in the absence of a rule, then rules will still have a role to play, but the outcomes the rules indicate will be presumptive and not absolute, with the presumption capable of being overridden when the injustice or inefficiency or other suboptimality of the rule-indicated outcome is sufficiently extreme.
Second, it is important to note the difference between a rule that is changed because of a recalcitrant event and a rule that remains unchanged even if the recalcitrant 14 Richard A. Posner, "The Jurisprudence of Skepticism," Michigan Law Review, vol. 86 (1988) California Law Review, vol. 77 (1989), pp. 455-71. event is dealt with by some form of avoiding the rule-generated erroneous outcome.
When a rule requiring drivers to drive no faster than sixty miles per hour is overridden by the necessity for some driver of rushing an injured person to the hospital, for example, the rule remains unchanged. But when an unexpected event occasions a revision of a rule, 17 as is often the case in the common law, the revised rule is not the same as the rule that existed prior to the revision. It may be unique to the common law -or at least definitional of common law method -that rules can be revised in the process of application, but when and how that occurs is not my primary focus here.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that changing a rule in order to avoid an erroneous outcome is different from overriding a rule in order to avoid an erroneous outcome, even though both can be understood as forms of defeasibility.
II
The key to the idea of defeasibility, therefore, is the potential for some applier, interpreter, or enforcer of a rule to make an ad hoc or spur-of-the-moment adaptation in order to avoid a suboptimal, inefficient, unfair, unjust, or otherwise unacceptable rulegenerated outcome. Sometimes the method of adaptation may be an equitable override by the same or another institution, sometimes it will be the power to engraft a new exception to a rule in order to prevent a bad outcome, and sometimes it will be the modification of a rule at the moment of its application. 18 At times, and especially as championed by Ronald Dworkin, avoidance of a poor outcome indicated by the most immediately applicable legal rules will be clothed in the language of locating the "real"
rule lying beneath what had only superficially seemed to be the applicable rule. 19 But whatever the method, and whatever the language in which it is described, the consequences are plain: What would have been a poor result had the rule been 17 And see note 12 above.
18 I set aside a soft form of defeasibility in which the rule is held to apply, but the sanction for its violation is substantially or totally ameliorated. This approach is the one championed by the mythical Justice Truepenny in Lon Fuller's legendary "The Case of the Speluncean Explorers," Harvard Law Review, vol. 62 (1949) , pp. 616-645, and is usefully compared with the opinion of Fuller's own alter ego, Justice Foster, who comes much closer to the idea of genuine defeasibility and who would simply have held the rule not to have applied in that case. answer but it is a bad one, from cases in which the rules give no answer at all.
When the New York Court of Appeals concluded in Riggs that Elmer Palmer could not inherit because of the maxim that "no man shall profit from his own wrong," it is best understood as having treated the most immediately applicable legal rule as defeasible in the service of justice. It is true that the "no man may profit from his own wrong" principle is narrower than the full domain of justice, but there are few dimensions of 20 "Faithfully" is perhaps too loaded a term here, and "literally" might be better, as long as we assume that literal application of a legal rule can include uncontroversial technical meaning and uncontroversial application of subsidiary principles of interpretation. 27 Hart would not have maintained that all answers were equally good, for he properly recognized that some answers even in the area of legal discretion would be better than others as a matter of policy, morality, politics, or any other legally legitimate but not legally mandated source of non-legal guidance.
Fuller argued, 28 but just as clearly would it be ridiculous to exclude it from the park on the authority of the "no vehicles in the park" rule. But Fuller also made a broader claim. For Fuller, it was not merely a contingent empirical matter that legal rules were always or at least typically (and preferably) defeasible in common law legal systems, but also that the defeasibility of legal rules was an essential feature of legality itself, a necessary component of any nondefective legal system, and thus on a par with the other desiderata of legality that for
Fuller came pretty close to defining law -or at least tje ideal of legality --itself. 30 For
Fuller, failing to treat a rule like the no-vehicles-in-the-park rule as defeasible was simply to abandon reason, and for Fuller it was of the essence of law that it be reasonable. A system that did not allow purpose-based or reason-based or equitable 28 Actually he didn't, but he should have. Occasionally in the grip of a radically contextual view of language and meaning, Fuller hinted that maybe the truck/statue was not a vehicle at all. This not only displays a mistaken view about language, but undercuts his own point, for the power of the example for Fuller's purposes resides precisely in the fact that the truck/statue whose exclusion from the park under this rule would be absurd is a vehicle, and is literally encompassed by the rule. 29 Hart did later acknowledge that legal systems might well understand the core of a rule in such a purpose-driven way. H.L.A. Hart, "Preface," in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 8. But this seeming concession is not much of a concession at all, because it simply takes the debate one level back, and that is because we can imagine that even serving the purpose behind a particular rule might produce an outcome inconsistent with the purpose behind the purpose, or with an all-things-considered conception of justice. Law and Jurisprudence, vol. 20 (2007), pp. 201-223 . Fuller was plainly sympathetic to the view that widespread failure to follow the dimensions of procedural legality he outlined would produce a system not properly called a legal system at all, but with respect to individual components of legality, such as defeasibility, he would more likely have described legal systems without them as defective legal systems than as not being legal systems at all.
context in which it is used on a particular occasion, then we can see that rules -which are written in words -can indeed generate poor outcomes, and we can see that some judge might in fact issue a ruling consistent with that poor outcome.
32
Indeed, not only can this happen, but in fact it does happen -and with some frequency. Perhaps most dramatic is the fact that Riggs v. Palmer turns out to be more exceptional than normal, even in the highly anti-formal American judicial system.
Although there are other cases in which the outcomes resemble those in Riggs, there are also many in which beneficiaries who were in some way or another culpably responsible for the death of the testator were allowed to inherit. Numerous other cases fit this mould, both in the United States and elsewhere, and thus it would be a mistake to describe the defeasibility of legal rules as a universal or even overwhelmingly common feature of decision-making by judges and by the 32 I recognize that in some circles this would be considered a controversial (or simply wrong) position, but this is not the place to belabor the standard responses to post-modern theories of meaning. Suffice it to say that without the ability of words to have acontextual or trans-contextual meaning, it is hard to see how we could understand each other, and even harder to explain the compositional nature of language, our ability to understand sentences we have never heard before. We know, absent any context, that "The cat is on the mat" is about cats and not dogs, mats and not ponds, and about a relationship captured by the word "on" that is different from the relationship suggested by "near," "next to," and "under."
33 Many of them are described in Frederick Schauer, "The Limited Domain of the Law," Virginia Law Review, vol. 90 (2004 Review, vol. 90 ( ), pp. 1909 Review, vol. 90 ( -1956 institution we commonly call a "legal system." Although legal decision-makers indeed commonly do treat the rules with which they deal as defeasible, just as commonly they do not. They treat the literal or plain language of a rule formulation as conclusive, and thus refrain from adding exceptions at the moment of application, from overriding the indications of the rule in the service of justice or equity or fairness or efficiency, and from modifying the rules at the moment of application. Putting aside the question for the moment whether such non-defeasibility is wise, it is at the very least possible, and indeed it is widespread. Rule-formulations have meanings that are distinct from the purposes or background justifications lying behind the rules and are distinct from what the best (or even a good) rule-free outcome in some particular instance would have been. Rules are defeasible to the extent that such rule-formulations may be changed at the moment of application for any of a number of reasons, but examples like those above, and countless others, show that rules are often applied as written -treated as non-defeasible -even when what seem to be valid defeating conditions are present. In the contemporary debates about jurisprudential methodology, it is sometimes claimed that identifying the essential features of the concept of law is largely or entirely a descriptive matter, albeit one that for some theorists requires identifying law's "function or purpose." 36 From this perspective defeasibility would be an essential property of the concept of law, or of a non-defective legal system, if it were ubiquitous in modern legal systems, and if we could scarcely imagine a legal system without it. But it turns out that neither is the case, and as a descriptive matter it is hard to defend the position that a legal system without widespread and legitimate defeasibility is for that reason not a legal system at all, or is a legal system but necessarily a defective one.
IV
That legal rules are often treated as non-defeasible does not mean that such a course is a wise one. Not does it mean that such a course is consistent with legality in the deeper and richer sense, and it is that question that we must now take up. Although legal decision-makers often treat legal rules as non-defeasible, are they right to do so, or is every example of failure to do so also a failure of legality?
36 See, for example, Jules L. Coleman, "Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, " Legal Theory, vol. 4 (1998), pp. 381-425, especially at pp. 387-395; Joseph Raz, " On the Nature of Law," Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, vol. 82 (1996) , pp. 1-25.
The arguments for rules are not unfamiliar, and most of the arguments for rules in general are arguments for treating rules as non-defeasible. If, for example, we (the designers of some decision-making environment) are wary of discretion, and distrustful of judges and other legal decision-makers who might be biased, corrupt, incompetent, ill-equipped for the job, or just very rushed, then we might want to constrain them by rules rather than granting wide discretion. Moreover, when the reasons for constraining decision-makers by rules are at their most powerful, we might not even trust the decision-makers to decide when some application of a rule is ridiculous or absurd, let alone unfair, inequitable, unjust, or inefficient. 37 It is easy to say that it would be absurd to exclude the truck used as a war memorial from the park, but the real question is whether and when some class of officials should be empowered to decide which applications are absurd and which are not. Moreover, rules also serve to allocate decision-making responsibility and therefore effectuate the separation of powers, in the non-technical sense of that term. To treat a rule as non-defeasible, therefore, is simply to decide that some but not other officials will have the power to cancel, override, amend, or modify an existing rule. And insofar as rules also bring the advantages of certainty, predictability, settlement, and stability for stability's sake, treating the rules as defeasible comes at the sacrifice of each of these values, even though of course it brings the potential advantages of fairness, equity, and, in theory, reaching the correct result in every instance.
Thus, once we recognize that it is linguistically and conceptually possible for there to be non-defeasible rules, the inquiry shifts to one about the advantages and disadvantages of treating rules as defeasible. To treat rules as non-defeasible is to accept the possibility -indeed, the virtual certainty over time -of some number of unjust or otherwise erroneous outcomes in particular cases, but that is endemic to the Rule of Law generally. Unless the Rule of Law is simply a synonym for reaching the best all-things-considered outcome, any addition of procedural values or considerations of stability for stability's sake or constraints on the decision maker's discretion -and these are precisely what differentiates the Rule of Law from simply doing the right thing -will also commit the legal system to some number of suboptimal outcomes. their own applications has become trite, but it reminds us that how a rule will be treated is not something that is inherent in the rule itself. Indulging again the assumption (and belief) that the plain or literal (but not necessarily the ordinary language) meaning of a rule can indicate an outcome, it is a function not of the rule but of how the rule will be treated whether that indicated outcome is to be taken as conclusive, presumptive, or even, at the extreme, as having no weight in itself, being but a totally transparent (to its background justification, or to the all-things-considered best outcome) heuristic or rule of thumb. Although it is possible that how the rules of a legal system will be treated will be function of yet further rules, it might be a useful shortcut to think of the determination of how the indications of a rule are to be treated as a component of the Hartian ultimate rule of recognition. And as such, it is a question of fact and not of law, although what this component of the Hartian rule of recognition should be might also be the subject of normative debate, in which the grounds of the debate would necessarily be philosophical, moral, political and much else, but not themselves legal.
The question of defeasibility is thus exposed as a descriptive and prescriptive one, but not a logical or conceptual one. It is logically and conceptually possible for rules to be interpreted, understood, applied and enforced according to the literal meaning of the component language of their formulations. Whether in this or that legal system they are in fact so treated is a descriptive question and, it turns out, as the few examples above illustrate, that as a descriptive matter defeasibility is less universal in actual legal systems than we might have thought, even in the legal systems in which we might have most expected it to exist.
With respect to the prescriptive question, whether the literal meaning of a ruleformulation will be treated as what the rule indicates, and whether what the rule indicates will be treated as conclusive, are questions that cannot be answered by reference to the moral goals of particularized justice. Those goals exist, to be sure, as
Plato, Aristotle, and countless successors have argued. But so too do the Rule of Law
